Community Development Approach in the Recovery of Selected Communities Affected by Typhoon Ondoy Flood[1]

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In September 2009, Metro Manila and the surrounding communities experienced the worst flood due to Typhoons Ondoy and Pepeng. The depth of the flood reached 30 feet in some communities, submerging a number of urban poor areas. Along the Marikina River, residents were either relocated or allowed to stay in their communities. But, those who were relocated to safer areas were confronted with new challenges due to problems in proximity and poor access to their sources of livelihood and the schools. Moreso, services for water, power and other basic provisions were inadequate. On the other hand, the people who stayed in the same vulnerable areas were able to immediately start rebuilding their houses and respective communities. Using the community development framework, this paper looks at the recovery and rebuilding of communities affected by the flood in two barangays: one that was relocated to another site; and, another that stayed in the vulnerable community. The outcome shows that the people who remained in the same community had a higher level of recovery compared to those in the relocation area. In this community, the residents had greater experiences in community education, organizing, resources and disaster risk management processes.

A. Community Development Framework for Disaster Risk Management

The socio-economic, political and cultural conditions of society contribute to the vulnerability of the people. More exposed to hazards are the poor who have very limited capacities to improve their situation. They do not have the needed

material resources to cope with and recover when affected by disasters and other calamities. At the same time, prevailing socio-cultural values and beliefs can perpetuate powerlessness among the people through lack of risk awareness, dependence on fate, and subservience attitude. The poor can also become easy prey of political leaders who take advantage of the people's weaknesses for their vested interests.

Over the years, the field of Community Development (CD) developed in response to the needs of the emerging and changing times. From a functionalist perspective when it was introduced in the 1950's, it adopted conflict perspective aimed to effect social change, particularly during the martial law and dictatorship period in the Philippines. Today, CD deals with many aspects of human lives and communities such as growth and sustenance, conflict resolution, rehabilitation and transformation of marginalized communities through people's participation and collective action. This means recognizing and building the people's innate potentials and capabilities, enabling them to define their direction, and having them participate in the process of change through collective action. Community Development facilitates the process of transforming the marginalized communities so that they may collectively act on their situations and on the external forces that undermine and perpetuate their oppressive conditions (Luna, 2009a; Luna, 2009b; Luna, 2006; Luna, 1999).

Community Education for Capacity Building and Knowledge Generation.- CD is concerned with the enhancement of the people's potentials and capabilities. "Education is a potent force for social transformation in terms of upliftment of people's welfare and working towards forming alternative structures and power relations" (Tungpalan, 1991, p. 2). People have inherent capacities and potentials that can be developed and mobilized for individual and community transformation. This entails the generation, re-orientation and transformation of knowledge and belief systems in order for the people to cultivate liberating and empowering community values. Such values include having the sense for equity, justice, cooperation and collective concern, nationalism, gender sensitivity, as well as environmental consciousness.

Local knowledge are community resources that have to be recognized and mobilized to counter the domesticating, conforming and dependency-creating values and attitude that have perpetuated the dominated society. Learning organizations have developed as well to facilitate the emergence of local knowledge. The people's knowledge and consciousness have to be translated into operational and effective actions through skills for community work such as community organizing, education and mobilization, human relations and communication, conflict confrontation, planning, management of community resources and the like.

Community Organizing and Governance (COG) – Community organizing is the core method in community development. As the people organized themselves, the people's organization becomes an instrument for collective community governance. Community organizing can be area-based, sectoral or issue-based. There are also supra-organizations in the forms of networks, alliances and coalitions. These organizations are the people's instruments in expressing their will and effecting changes in their communities. They can be instrumental in influencing the local and state roles and functions for community development. It can make the marginalized groups with silent voices such as the women, children, people with disabilities, elderly and indigenous people gain power for the promotion of their rights. They are tools of the people to engage and negotiate with the power and duty bearers such as the local government units, local and international NGOs in asserting their rights and ensuring people-based community governance.

Community Resource and Disaster Risk Management (CRDRM)- Community resources such as land, urban services, credits and capital, forests, coastal and other natural resources of the community have been used as an agenda or as entry point for organizing the poor; as venue for strengthening and consolidating organizations; and, as issues for arousing interest and mobilizing the people for political organizing. Community resource management is a tool for promoting inter-generational equity by ensuring that the future generation will still enjoy the environment. Similarly, disaster risk reduction is viewed "within the broad context of sustainable development" (ISDR, 2007, p. 154).

Community resource management includes the conservation, protection and rehabilitation of the environment to ensure a wholesome, livable, sustainable and ecologically - balanced habitat. Disaster risk management involves the assessment of risk and vulnerabilities, the development of peoples' capacity, and mobilization for preventing, mitigating, preparing, responding and recovering from disasters. Both CRM and DRM necessitate the involvement of the people in the advocacy for policies and programs for the ultimate benefits and welfare of the people and the community. Disasters occur when the resource thresholds and the environmental limits are reached or violated. Losses take place when economic risks are missed in the planning of social services and livelihood initiatives.

Community-Based Disaster Risk Management

The paradigm shift from the reactive and emergency-focused disaster response to a more holistic or comprehensive disaster risk management framework gave impetus to community-based disaster risk management (CBDRM). The new paradigm integrates the management and reduction of risks, protection of development gains, sustainable human development and mainstreaming disaster reduction into development (Delica, 2003).

Community-Based Disaster Risk Management is concerned with participatory approaches in reducing possible loses in the lives, properties, community resources and environment due to natural and human induced hazards. It hopes to accomplish long term transformational changes and short- term remedial improvements in the well being of the people. It views disasters as a question of people's vulnerability and empowers people to address the roots of vulnerabilities by transforming structures that generate inequity and underdevelopment (Heijmans & Victoria 2001; Luna, 2009a; Luna, 2009b; Luna, 2006).

While CBDRM puts the people as central to the process, the communities maintain the right to receive external assistance in times of emergency and during post disaster recovery. The less vulnerable assisting the vulnerable one is a principle in disaster risk management. But despite looking at the community as the prime

actor, CBDRM does not take away the responsibility and accountability of the state to protect its citizens.

B. Research Problem and Methodology

The flood caused by Ondoy and Pepeng is considered as the worst that hit Metro Manila and the surrounding provinces. Almost one million families and five million individuals from 27 provinces and 36 cities were affected. More than 1,000 people died from this disaster (ADB,AusAid,EC,UN,WB,GFDRR, 2009). Middle class subdivisions along the Marikina River and Laguna de Bay were under water. For weeks, some condominium units in Quezon City had no water and electricity because the underground floor that housed their water pumps and electric motors were destroyed by the flood.

Pictures of cars on top of each other became symbols of the Ondoy flood, along with the scenes of people carrying their belongings on their heads while walking on flooded streets. Scenes from Ondoy also featured destroyed shanties and submerged mansions, overcrowded evacuation centers and long queues of people waiting for relief goods. At such point in time, the flood was a great equalizer.

But, the days after the flood was a different story. Those who had resources were able to recover easily, taking temporary refuge in hotels and reconstructing their homes with new designs that can mitigate the impact of future flooding. On the other hand, the poor families had very little choices. Those living in the vulnerable areas returned to the same place, cleaned it up and braced some preparedness measures, praying that such disastrous event would not happen again. Fortunately or unfortunately, others who could not come back to their original areas declared as dangerous were relocated in resettlement areas.

Within the context of the community development framework, it is imperative to see how the poor families were able to recover from the adverse impact of the flood. This study sought to answer these questions: How does community development processes facilitate the recovery of families affected by the flood? What is the recovery status of the families who remained in vulnerable

areas and those who were relocated to resettlement areas? What roles have been played by the external support institutions? What are the challenges that have to be addressed and what strategies can be put forward to hasten the recovery of the people and communities?

Case studies were conducted in two communities affected by Typhoon Ondoy, namely: Barangay Sta. Ana in San Mateo; and, Barangay San Jose in Montalban. Both are located in the province of Rizal and were flooded by Typhoon Ondoy with a depth of 30 feet. Families in Barangay Sta. Ana returned to their respective communities after the flood. On the other hand, families along the river in Barangay San Jose were relocated to another area in Montalban, Barangay San Isidro,

Since the researcher was directly involved in the relief assistance in both communities and in the capability building projects implemented in Barangay Sta. Ana, the data gathering for this research was conducted through documentation of the activities with the assistance of CD students doing fieldwork in the respective areas. In addition, key informant interviews were done with the local leaders and officers of the resettlement site as well as focus group discussions (FGD) with the community leaders and residents. To determine the recovery status of the families in the two communities, a survey was also conducted.

C. The Communities in Action Towards Disaster Recovery

Case 1: Barangay Sta. Ana, San Mateo

Barangay Sta Ana lies along the Marikina River. Most of the families affected by the flooding during Typhoon Ondoy were informal settlers. They stayed at the peripheries of the subdivisions. They received assistance from the government and non-government organizations in the form of relief goods, medical services and construction materials. In October 2009, a collaborative effort of the CSWCD Sikhay Kilos Development Association and Oxfam UK assisted the community by providing hygiene kits and livelihood assistance to affected families.

The emergency food security and livelihood (EFSL) program undertaken by Oxfam provided funds to support the livelihood projects of the families organized into people's organizations. The first phase involved the distribution of P 1,000 per family given together with the family hygiene kits. The second phase involved the distribution of P5,000 each to selected needy families to enable them to start or recover their businesses and help augment their income. The third phase was the provision of capital to groups or organizations for livelihood projects. Seven organizations from the barangay were given funds for their businesses. The members of the seven organizations were entrusted with the responsibility of running their small businesses (Galema & Caido, 2010).

A capability building project undertaken by the Sikhay Kilos was also implemented through the support of Oxfam. The capability building project in Sta. Ana oriented the Barangay Council and the members of the BDCC on DRR. The project staff helped in identifying, organizing and mobilizing community leaders and volunteers who could be members of committees for DRR. They conducted information and orientation on DRR among the family representatives through focus group discussions, community meetings, informal discussions, house to house visits and campaign materials (Luna, Firmase & Eugenio, 2010).

Community Development students from CSWCD, were also fielded in Barangay Sta. Ana. The students integrated with the residents, conducted community assessment and socio-economic profiling, training needs assessment, implemented capacity building activities, and assisted the community leaders in organizational development and in implementing the community projects.

Case Two: Barangay San Jose, Rodriguez

Barangay San Jose is adjacent to the Marikina River. Many of its residents live on the river bank. Flooding from Typhoon Ondoy struck the community in the morning of September 26, 2009. But on the evening of September 25, some of the areas in the adjacent village were already flooded below the knee level.

Nevertheless, this was considered normal since they were used to such flooding. A woman vendor narrated that by 5:00 in the morning of September 26, the flood in San Jose already reached chin-level. By 8:00 a.m, they had to evacuate to their store in the public market as the flood rose swiftly reaching roof-level height in just a few minutes. She claimed that her family lost all belongings. They stayed for one week in the public market, and later transferred to the evacuation center in a sports oval.

Another woman who worked outside of the village said that she was already at work when the flood started to rise right in her workplace. When she tried to go home, the flood in the poblacion or town proper was already waist-high. Along with other commuters, they were forced to seek higher ground in another village. However, it also got flooded and they were forced to spend the whole evening standing and submerged in chest-high water. The next day, she saw that their house in San Jose was totally washed out. She looked for her family and found them at the evacuation center in an elementary school. They were later given a tent as their temporary shelter.

A mother of five children recalled that as early as 2:00 a.m. on September 26, 2009, she noticed the rising depth of the flood due to the heavy rains. They did not evacuate immediately because she was concerned of the hogs she raised for a living. When she observed that the flood was getting worse, she evacuated to the roof of house. The flood was rising to neck-high level. They, then, settled at the sports oval. She said that they did not go hungry because she was able to prepare food and water prior to evacuation. However, they had to endure sleeping cold, wet, and feeling itchy due to the flood waters. It took them the next day before they were able to take a bath and change into to dry clothes.

A man related that when the flood started rising, he got concerned because there was an electric post that still had power. He swam to the barangay hall to ask for assistance but nobody was there. He then borrowed a rubber float which he used to evacuate his children and their belongings. He was not able to return the second time because the flood had reached the second level of the house.

Reflecting on the effects of Typhoon Ondoy and the flood, the participants in the FGDs said that they lost their homes and belongings. They also lost the assets they used for earning a living, such as their equipment in auto machine shop, utensils for cooking, sewing machine, and swine. Children had to stop schooling because they lost their school uniforms and school materials. Children got sick of bronchitis, among others.

One woman cried as she related that her husband committed suicide when they were already at the resettlement site. Prior to this, her family was experiencing serious financial problems because they had no money for the medical expenses of one of their children and another one bitten by a dog.

The Evacuation and Relocation Process

When Typhoon Ondoy struck Barangay San Jose, all efforts of the Barangay Council were concentrated on rescue operations and evacuation. On the day after the typhoon on September 27, 2009, the Barangay LGU designated the San Jose Elementary School as the evacuation center for 331 families. All the rooms in the school had comfort rooms. When the classes resumed on October 13, 2011, the families were transferred to a covered court in the town plaza. Others were given tents and stayed in the sports ground. However, the sports oval had one comfort room only. The water was also rationed in the evacuation center.

The evacuees who stayed at the San Jose Elementary School were the first batch to be relocated at the San Isidro Resettlement area on November 11, 2009. At the evacuation center, government workers from the Municipal Social Welfare Office made a list of qualified beneficiaries. Families whose homes were totally damaged by Ondoy were prioritized by the LGU to qualify for a housing unit. Site visit verification of the claimant or requesting family was done by the barangay LGU. The claimant was also required to submit photographs of the damaged house as part of the application documents. The barangay LGU then, forwarded the applications to the Housing and People's Development Center of

the municipal LGU. The municipal LGU endorsed the application to the provincial government, who had to finally endorse the applications to the National Housing Authority (NHA).

The families were informed one week in advance before they were transferred to the resettlement site, but they had no idea about the size and appearance of the housing units. Families were transported from Barangay San Jose to the resettlement site in a dump truck arranged by the barangay LGU.

The San Isidro Resettlement

Barangay San Isidro is the site of resettlement projects of the government. The governor of Rizal and the housing and urban development agency of the government agreed to designate two sites in the San Isidro Resettlement. Southville 8 and 8A were designated as relocation areas for Typhoon Ondoy victims among residents coming from the municipalities of Taytay and Rodriguez. The first batch of families was brought to Southville on November 10, 2009, while the second batch was brought on December 29, 2009. Almost 400 families were resettled in San Isidro.

The NHA managed the entire resettlement area. The newly resettled residents occupied row houses whose individual unit was 20 square meter in size. There were piped water facilities and toilets inside the units. The families were given a one year moratorium to pay the amortization of their housing units, after which they had to pay about $6 per month. The families were not allowed to sell their units. They were also prohibited from making any permanent development or construction in front of their housing units.

Engaged in community relations was the NHA for information dissemination. It is responsible in providing orientation to newly settled households on the rules and regulations of the resettlement site and payment obligations of unit owners. The NHA was involved in organizing the homeowner associations per block. There was a finance unit responsible for collecting payment obligations

of homeowners. The state management unit managed and monitored the documentation of homeowners. Likewise, a livelihood unit was tasked to provide training on livelihood. Responsible for ensuring compliance on building and construction requirements of contractors was a technical unit, which was also in charge of making repairs on the housing units.

Prior to the transfer of the residents from the evacuation center to the resettlement site, the evacuees formed an organization named San Jose Original Relocatees. The purpose of the organization was to enable the families to help each other on matters pertaining to their needs as relocatees. The main participation of the organization was to provide guides for the interviewers of Oxfam. However, there was an impression among some members that the organization was biased in the selection of relief beneficiaries.

There were also accounts that the collection for the payment of electricity was mismanaged by some leaders of the organization. Furthermore, the residents confided that the NHA officers were discouraging the formation of an association in the resettlement area, except for the organization that will be established by the NHA which was by residential blocks. Nevertheless, the residents still preferred to form their own organization to help those who were in need. They also believed that it would be more possible to solicit projects if they had an organization.

Services provided

As mentioned, the resettlement program provided a row housing unit for each family with a 20 square meter floor area. The families would be paying an amortization of P 300 per month or 2-4% of their monthly income for 25-30 years. According to an NHA officer, the selection of the beneficiaries was done mainly by the LGU and did not follow the procedure employed by NHA. The new residents were not given orientation regarding their responsibilities as new unit owners, particularly on their financial obligations.

The selection process employed by the LGU was seen to have political bias towards affected residents identified with the LGU. Some professional

squatters who were previously awarded housing units but sold their rights, managed to be included in the list of endorsed families by the provincial LGU. This problem was attributed to non-compliance with the usual selection process used by the NHA. There were even some residents who have illegally occupied certain housing units and were bullying legitimate unit owners.

Due to the urgency of evacuating the families, the facilities for electricity were not yet put up when the families started occupying their units.

D. Integrated Analysis: Community Development as an Approach to Disaster Recovery

This section provides an integrated analysis using the Community Development framework discussed in the beginning and the outcome of the recovery status survey conducted among the residents in Barangay Sta Ana and Barangay San Jose who were resettled in Barangay San Isidro, the resettlement site.

Community Education for Capacity Building and Knowledge Generation

There is a very strong expression of endogenous attributes such as the *bayanihan* spirit, which is a form of mutual aid that is characterized by self-help, volunteerism, reciprocity and community cohesion. This became very pronounced in the two barangays at the height of the flooding. The magnitude of flooding in the two communities was the same, but nobody died in both communities. The people in both communities said that their unity and concern for each other was of great help and this became even stronger after the flood. They had local knowledge and practices that helped them survived the tragedy. However, these knowledge and skills were focused on disaster response and emergencies, rather than risk reduction. In Barangay Sta. Ana, the families were given training on hazards analysis, DRR concepts and strengthening the local organizations. On the other hand, those in the resettlement were not given these trainings. Hence, the families in the two communities still need capacity building for DRR and sustainable livelihood.

By doing CD research in the communities, the local practices and experiences in disaster response surfaced. Table 1 below shows the adaptive mechanisms of the community in times of emergencies and their own assessment about their recovery from disaster.

Table 1. Comparative Features of the Community Education Dimension

Features	Barangay Sta. Ana (Families stayed in the same vulnerable area)	Barangay San Jose/San Isidro (Resettled Families)
Pre-existing		
1. Bayanihan: self-help, volunteerism, collective work, reciprocity, community cohesion	Very pronounced before and during the disaster event; became stronger after the disaster	Very pronounced before and during the disaster event; became stronger after the disaster
2. Skills in emergency response, disaster preparedness, small scale entrepreneurship and governance of community affairs	Very pronounced even during and after the disaster event	Very pronounced during the disaster event but was displaced due to relocation.
3. Awareness of the conditions such as causes of disasters, their and potential and capabilities	Very pronounced	Very pronounced
CD Inputs		
1.Hazards assessment	Provided	No educational inputs were given except a brief orientation on the rules in the resettlement site.
2. Disaster risk reduction concepts and processes	Provided	
3. Organizational development	Provided	

Community Organizing and Governance

In terms of organizing, both communities have similar community organizing situation before the disaster. There were organizations that were endogenous in the community such as neighborhood, kinship and peer groups, formal barangay council, and formal community groups such as organizations among women, youth, and other local groups. In Barangay Sta. Ana, these community groups were revived or strengthened by the crises as the people had to respond to the emergency. The capital provision given led to the revival of some of the groups who planned and implemented the community projects.

On the other hand, the relocation of the families from Barangay San Jose to San Isidro displaced also the community organization, both formal and informal ones. While a new group composed of resettled families was formed, they were discouraged by the housing agency which asserted for the establishment of only one organization which they will establish. The residents' initiative for self-governance was dampened by the government agency's policy concerning neighborhood association. Furthermore, the displacement brought the resettled families to a new Barangay Council that was unfamiliar to them.

Table 2. Comparative Features of the Community Organizing Dimension

Features	Barangay Sta. Ana (Families stayed in the same vulnerable area)	Barangay San Jose/San Isidro (Resettled Families)
Pre-existing		
1. Endogenous and local governance such as neighborhood, kinship and peer group.	Very pronounced	Very pronounced before but was displaced when
2. Formal barangay governance: Barangay Council and committees; disaster response team	Very pronounced	they were resettled in the new site
3. Formal community groups and formal leaders	Very pronounced	
CD Inputs		
1. Re-orientation, training and revitalization of the formal community groups	Done	Not applicable; the Barangay Council remained in the original area
2. Formation of new interest groups	Livelihood and cluster-based groups were formed	• Locally initiated organization of new settler from Brgy. San Jose • Housing agency mandated Homeowner Association • Livelihood-based new interest groups
3. Linkages building with other organization and resource base	With both government, NGOs and academe	Basically with the government

The families from the two communities were given P1,000 as food security and livelihood assistance. Some who were considered by the assisting NGO as very poor were later given P4,500 each for livelihood purposes. Some of the families were able to use it for livelihood while others used it for food and other household expenses. These included buying a sewing machine, using it as capital for a *balut* (a Filipino egg delicacy with embryo inside) business and *sari-sari* store, as well as buying medicines and food.

Those who were resettled found the livelihood opportunities in their former community better than in the resettlement site. One participant claimed that they used to earn P 2,500.00 per week by collecting junks (*nangangalakal*). Another participant said that she used to earn P 200.00 per day with her rolling store, but is now finding it hard to earn money at the resettlement site. One resident who used to earn P1,300 per week had to resign from her work in a shopping mall because of the far distance and long travel time.

On the contrary, the families who were not resettled were able to resume their jobs and other sources of livelihood. While they recognized that their place was vulnerable to flood, they claimed that they have developed a system of preparing and responding to the flood. They are now aware of when to evacuate and had learned ways of securing their belongings during such disasters.

Table 3. Comparative Features of the Community Resource and Disaster Risks Management

Features	Barangay Sta. Ana (Families stayed in the same vulnerable area)	Barangay San Jose/San Isidro (Resettled Families)
Pre-existing		
1. Community facilities and utilities	Existing	Existing __
2. Land tenure	Land owners and informal settlers	Informal settlers
3. Livelihood	Formal and informal	Formal and informal
4. Environment	Farmlands along the river; urban settlement	Farmlands along the river; urban settlement
5. Main risks	Flooding; non-ownership of the land by the informal settlers	Flooding; non-ownership of the land by the informal settlers
CD Inputs		
1. Relief goods	Done by both government and non-government groups	Done by both government and non-government groups
2. Cash capital for livelihood	Micro-credit, rice retail, water supply;	Micro-credit; rice retail
3. Housing	Materials provided	New housing units
4. Community initiated facilities: road improvement, street lights, water supply source	Road improvement, street lights, water supply source	Government provided facilities in the resettlement site; No electricity; water not potable
5. Risk Reduction	Hazard assessment, DRR training, linkages with DRR organizations	No orientation and training

Recovery Status

In disaster risk reduction and management, tools were developed to assess and monitor the state of DRM and the progress of implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA). The baseline assessment on the state of DRM in the Philippines was done using a five-point scale with a scoring of 1 as very low and 5 as very high (Cabrido, 2008). A composite index score was obtained after scores were given by evaluators. The 2009 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction also made use of 5-point scale scoring system to determine progress in the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action (GARDRR, 2009).

Based on the respondents' assessment which came from different sectors in the Philippines such as representatives of the NGOs, people's organizations and local government and agencies, the status of the HFA implementation in the Philippines was obtained. A five-point rating scale was also used, after which the average was taken in every priority item of the HFA. Thus, governance got 3.44; risk assessment, monitoring and warning, 3.41; knowledge and education, 3.40; underlying risk factors, 3.20 and disaster preparedness and response, 3.42 (Center for Disaster Preparedness, 2009).

In like manner, the recovery status of the families in the two communities was determined by coming up with a scoring system where the respondents assessed the recovery items or indicators with a four-point rating scale. The same tool was used in determining the recovery status of the families affected by the landslide in Barangay. Guinsaugon, St. Bernard, Southern Leyte (Luna, de-Asa Luna, Molina & Molina, 2011).

There were 74 FGD participants in Barangay Sta Ana and 62 FGD participants and residents in the resettlement site. The respondents were individually asked to determine their recovery status through a survey form, after an explanation of the items by the facilitator, using the following scale:

NA - Not applicable
1 - Not yet recovered
2 - Little recovery
3 - Full recovery
4 - "Built back better"

A descriptive and comparative analysis of the recovery status in the two communities is presented in Table 4. The "Not applicable" (NA) responses can show the magnitude of damages in the two communities. The larger the percentages of "NA" responses, the lesser the number of families who encountered such losses. For total loss of the house (Item A.2), Barangay Sta. Ana scored 76% while Barangay San Jose scored only 3%. For the loss of income (Item B.6), 30% of the respondents from Barangay Sta found this not applicable to them while only 7% of those from the resettlement said so. The latter means that 93% of the respondents

from the barangays lost income when they were resettled. Apparently, the families in the resettlement encountered more losses (at least 10% difference) in most of the items such as family assets (Items B), community services (Item C), and relationship and governance (Items D).

The results of the assessment show that the people from Barangay Sta. Ana had a higher level of recovery status than those who were relocated in Barangay Isidro. This is shown in the qualitative descriptions from the previous section, as well as by the quantitative assessment where Barangay Sta Ana got a Recovery Status Index of 2.53 against 2.04 in the resettlement. The last two columns in Table 4 show the comparisons of the recovery status in each item. It is very noticeable that the community that remained in their area has higher recovery status compared to the one that was resettled.

E. Conclusions

Communities have endogenous system of responding, preparing and recovering from disasters. The mere fact that nobody died despite the 30 feet flood shows the capacity of both communities. Rescue operations were done by the barangays and volunteers from the community. They helped each other and as many would say, the neighbors helped each other in many ways, during and right after the disaster. The residents from both communities recognized that the disaster made them more united and concerned of each other's needs.

The limitation in disaster prevention and mitigation is mainly due to given natural vulnerabilities and "forced option" to be in vulnerable area. The people had very little capacity to prevent or mitigate flooding because flooding is beyond their control They can only respond and escape from flooding but they cannot stop it. They have not done anything to cause the flood. There was just too much rain and the shallow river was not their own-making. Their presence in the vulnerable community is a 'forced option' because the families have no other recourse but to live in areas even if these are dangerous. The Filipino metaphor for this is *kapit sa patalim* literally translated as *holding to a knife*. This means *a choice of no option despite recognizable risks.*

Table 4. Comparative Recovery Status in Barangay Sta. Ana and Barangay San Isidro

Recovery Items Assessed in the Two Communities	Distribution of the Respondents' Ratings of their Recovery Status Per Item in Percentage (%)										Average Rating of the Recovery Status[2]	
	Barangay Sta Ana: Un-resettled Community					Barangay San Jose: Resettled in Brgy San Isidro					Sta Ana	San Jose
	NA	1	2	3	4	NA	1	2	3	4		
A. Physical and Mental Health												
1. From death of relatives	97	-	3	-	-	87	8	3	2	-	2.00	1.50
2. Sickness	41	18	11	12	18	32	27	18	19	3	2.51	1.98
3. Physical injuries such as losses of legs, sight, etc	94	2	4	-	-	82	5	7	2	5	1.75	2.36
4. Emotional trauma	23	25	25	25	3	10	52	21	11	7	2.07	1.70
B. Family Assets												
1. Destruction of the house	23	19	26	23	8	10	44	23	6	18	2.68	1.98
2. Total loss of the house	76	6	7	7	6	3	43	30	8	16	2.50	1.98
3. Loss of household assets	14	25	26	24	11	5	45	40	3	7	2.24	1.69
4. Loss of assets for livelihood	34	15	27	15	8	14	45	32	7	2	2.25	1.58
5. Sources of livelihood	29	23	19	22	7	15	39	32	13	2	2.18	1.74
6. Income	30	31	26	11	1	7	47	34	10	3	1.74	1.69
C. Community Services												
1. Electrical services	27	15	11	32	15	16	69	9	5	-	2.64	1.24
2. Water source	31	14	8	25	22	12	43	32	10	3	2.86	1.70
3. Education of children	36	10	12	19	23	32	13	24	23	8	2.87	2.38
4. Roads, pathways, bridges	46	13	13	16	16	23	18	11	23	26	2.66	2.73
5. System of transportation	57	8	10	15	10	16	34	23	26	2	2.61	1.83
6. Natural environment	34	12	30	15	8	8	40	15	18	19	2.29	2.17
7. Recreational facilities	45	7	16	26	6	10	43	28	15	5	2.55	1.80
8. Market	73	3	7	8	10	15	24	24	26	11	2.90	2.28
D. Relationships and Governance												
1. Relationship with spouse	85	1	3	1	10	66	2	11	10	12	3.27	2.90
2. Relationships with neighbors	71	6	6	6	12	49	7	10	21	13	2.86	2.81
3. Community organizations	74	3	3	3	18	31	8	26	27	8	3.37	2.51
4. Barangay Governance	66	6	6	12	11	26	16	27	19	11	2.84	2.35
Recovery Status Index in the Two Communities											2.53	2.04

* Score = $\frac{F(1) \times 1 + F(2) \times 2 + F(3) \times 3 + F(4) \times 4}{F(1) + F(20) + F(3) + F(4)}$; F(1) = frequency of "not yet recovered responses"

F (4)= frequency of "built back better" responses.

Displacement of people due to natural disaster can be another disaster that is human induced. While it is true that the families who are relocated in less vulnerable areas would be safe from the flood, there are other hazards and risks that would be faced if the necessary services and amenities are not available in the new community. This is exactly what happened in the resettlement area. The provision for electricity and water supply is not properly put in place, hence the people had to face new threats such as diseases and a lot of mental anguish.

Minimal displacement and losses could mean faster recovery. The families from Barangay Sta. Ana lost their personal and household assets but they felt that they were able to recover from these losses as compared to those from Barangay Isidro who have not recovered from the loss of their assets, households and other resources in the community. The residents said that they were able to recover from the losses through the help of agencies and other people who came to help. When they came back to their community after the flood, they cleaned up the house and their surroundings and availed of the relief goods given to them. In a week's time, the life in the community was back to normal.

Community development perspectives and processes can hasten the recovery process by facilitating capacity building, organizing and resource and risk management. The cases show that processes that intend to develop the capacity of the people through training and organizing hasten the recovery process. This allows the people to participate in decision making process, which in itself is a strategy for recovery. The provision of resources to the community such as cash, household utensils and capital for economic projects have helped as well, though there are some issues that have to be dealt with. These include the following:

- The tendency of the local group to form or revive groups to enable them to avail of the capital being provided by the support organizations, some of which eventually became active after the funds were given.

- The inadequacy of the groups to manage their projects due to social preparation, inadequate capacity and poor orientation and values such as the lack of commitment to pay back funds borrowed.

- The technical feasibility of some of the projects.

- The lack of monitoring and accountability mechanisms to ensure the proper management of the projects.

- The distribution of some items such as soap which were too much for the family to use, while other families were not given such items at all.

The problems related to the socio-economic projects cropped out because there were community development principles and processes that were not put in place. The idea was externally driven and the people just responded to the call to generate proposal for economic projects that would be funded. The hastily done process of providing assistance did not allow enough social preparation for the people to become more organized. Likewise, its management system, policies and procedures were inadequately done.

Community collaboration with external support groups must be anchored on community context, participatory paradigm and an attitude of learning from the people. Communities definitely need the assistance of external organizations. However, the latter should serve as a support group and not as the lead in the community organizing process. Actions have to be based in the context of the community, assessed and analyzed with the people. External organizations have to assume the role of facilitator, bearing an attitude of being co-learners with the community.

Endnote

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